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Abstract This issue of Criminal Law and Philosophy contains three papers on a topic of
increasing importance within the field of ‘‘neurolaw’’—namely, the implications for
criminal law of direct brain intervention based mind altering techniques (DBI’s). To locate
these papers’ topic within a broader context, I begin with an overview of some prominent
topics in the field of neurolaw, where possible providing some references to relevant
literature. The specific questions asked by the three authors, as well as their answers and
central claims, are then sketched out, and I end with a brief comment to explain why this
particular topic can be expected to gain more prominence in coming years.
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Neurowhat?
In terms of its history, neurolaw is a relatively recent field. Although discussion of many of
the issues still at the heart of current debates dates back to the early 1990s (Martell 1992),
much of the activity in this field has taken place during the past decade. In this respect this
field’s youthfulness reflects the relatively-recent advances made within the field of cog-
nitive neuroscience, in large degree made possible by the development of powerful new
diagnostic neuroimaging techniques—ones with fancy acronyms like CAT, PET, SPECT,
MRI, fMRI and DTI, etc. (Jones et al. 2009)—that made it possible to study the structure
and function of living brains in situ, with hitherto-unprecedented detail, without ever
having to reach for cranial saws, drills and scalpels. In terms of content, I find it useful to
categorize the topics discussed in this field under four headings—scientific discoveries,
diagnostic techniques, intervention techniques, and legal procedure—though this catego-
rization is by no means conventional nor prescriptive (for other categorizations see e.g.
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Eagleman 2008; Gazzaniga 2008; Goodenough and Tucker 2010; Lekovic 2008; Mobbs
et al. 2007; Prado and Patterson 2010).
First, scientific discoveries about the nature of human cognition and volition have
motivated a number of discussions. For instance, much ink has been spilled debating
whether, in light of emerging evidence that the brain is just another mechanism that
operates according to laws of nature, any room remains for concepts like responsibility and
practices like punishment (Greene and Cohen 2004; Morse 2006). Similar-sounding doubts
have sprung from a different angle—empirical studies suggest that humans have much less
conscious control over their thought and action than we typically take ourselves to have.
This has been taken by some to entail that the law should cut everyone more slack, since its
expectations are founded on unrealistic and even patently false assumptions about what
humans are actually capable of (Levy forthcoming; Dahan-Katz forthcoming; Davies
forthcoming). Research into the role of emotion in moral judgment is cited to criticise the
law’s conception of rationality—debates about whether psychopaths should be excused on
account of their affective deficits come to mind (Blair 2007; Fine and Kennett 2004; Haji
2010). And some suggest that neuroscience might help us to design more effective and
efficient laws by providing greater insight into what actually motivates human behaviour
(Jones 2004). The underlying idea here is that to the extent that the law regulates human
behaviour, and the brain plays a key role in generating that behaviour, better knowledge of
the brain will lead to better-designed laws.
Second, new diagnostic techniques hold out the promise of helping to address a number
of practical legal problems. For instance, perhaps improved brain-based lie detection
techniques can be developed that check directly in the brain for signs of deception or of
familiarity with ‘‘guilty knowledge’’ (i.e. evidence that only the perpetrator would
recognize) (see the collection of papers in Bizzi et al. 2009). Others raise the possibility
that some diagnostic techniques might eventually provide more objective and perhaps even
foolproof ways of individually assessing people’s true mental capacities and thus their
responsibility (Vincent 2010; Hirstein and Sifferd 2011). And yet others ponder whether
this new science and technology might help us to better predict people’s propensities,
dangerousness and recidivism (Greely 2009; Kaplan 2009)—putting it crudely, the
underlying idea is that there might be tell-tale features of certain people’s brains that
correlate with dangerousness and criminality.
Third, in addition to diagnostic techniques, neuroscientists also use a range of inter-
vention techniques, in particular DBIs.1 Beyond the cranial saw, drill and scalpel, there are
also gamma ray knives which focus multiple beams of radiation on a single point to destroy
tissue where the rays intersect without needing to crack open the skull or to cut through
intervening tissue to get to a target site, as well as deep brain stimulation, radioisotope
therapy, transcranial magnetic stimulation, electroconvulsive therapy, and an increasing(ly
profitable) range of psychopharmaceuticals to name just a few DBIs. With increased
1 Direct brain intervention based techniques are typically contrasted with what at least intuitively seem like
more indirect ways of changing people’s minds—e.g. cognitive behavioural therapy or even just talking to
another person. But as Neil Levy points out, it can be very difficult to put a finger on precisely what is meant
to be morally significant about this distinction. After all, if both methods involve changing another’s mind in
the same way (i.e. with the same outcome), then why should one method be treated differently than the other
(2007:62–9)? Furthermore, as Jan Christoph Bublitz and Reinhard Merkel (this issue) point out, it may
sometimes even be difficult to decide whether to categorize a given intervention—e.g. subliminal adver-
tising—as an instance of direct or indirect intervention. Nevertheless, for our purposes Bublitz and Merkel’s
suggestion that ‘‘[r]oughly one could say that indirect interventions are inputs into the cognitive machinery
our minds are adapted to process, whereas direct interventions change the cognitive machinery itself’’ nicely
captures the intuitive idea that this distinction is meant to capture.
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knowledge of how the brain functions comes the promise of developing better-targeted
treatments for pathological brain conditions like Alzheimer’s and Parkinson’s disease.
However, what has roused interest from neurolaw researchers is the possibility that DBIs
might be developed for use not just in a clinical setting, but to provide (e.g.) treatments for
brain-based causes of (mental disorders correlated with) criminal and disfavoured
behaviour (Bomann-Larsen 2011; Greely 2008), ways of disabling witnesses’ ability to lie
and deceive (Coukell 2006; Rosen 2007), drugs that enhance witness memory (Vedder and
Klaming 2010), and a range of other cognitive enhancing drugs which raise numerous
political and legal issues (Farah et al. 2004; Glannon 2008, 2011; Vincent forthcoming).
Fourthly, as to legal procedure, discussion has also focused on whether existing criminal
procedure and rules can accommodate such new scientific evidence and intervention tech-
niques. For instance, do existing rules allow this high-tech evidence to be adduced at trial, and
if so then at which stage? The Federal Rules of Evidence and the Daubert standard come to
mind for the North American context (Tovino 2007), and in Australia the Commonwealth
Evidence Act 1995 and similar State acts provide pertinent examples (Houston and
Vierboom 2012). Who is permitted to bring such evidence to trial and for what purposes can it
be used—e.g. by the prosecution to establish guilt, or only by the defence to counter alle-
gations of guilt? What role should expert testimony, which is often needed to interpret such
evidence, be allowed to play, and what principles should judges use when experts disagree
about the value of particular evidence? Assuming that such evidence should at least some-
times be admissible, what standing should it have in relation to other kinds of evidence—e.g.
should brain-based lie detection results trump witness testimony and the jury’s role in
credibility assessments or vice versa (Chandler 2010)? How should such evidence and tes-
timony be treated—for instance, if mind reading ever becomes a reality,2 would it constitute
and be governed by rules pertaining to physical evidence, or would it be an instance of and
thus be governed by rules pertaining to testimonial evidence (Farahany 2012)? Might the use
of such techniques to gather this evidence impinge on existing rights—e.g. would brain-
based mind reading techniques infringe the right to remain silent (Fox 2011)? And how about
the legality of using DBIs to achieve the various aims of the criminal law?
The above list of topics is only intended to convey the flavour of some of the work that
is done in this field. Also, importantly, a recurring theme is that much of what is discussed
is in many cases aspirational—i.e. neither the science nor the technology or the techniques
are yet sufficiently advanced, tested or polished to be rolled out into courtrooms and used
in real life cases. Most of these discussions should therefore be viewed as hypothetical
explorations, as investigations into what could or should be done once the science, tech-
nology and techniques are ready for prime time. However, some actual legal cases have
already been affected, and in particular two cases from Italy come to mind. In one,
evidence that a convicted murderer carried an allele for the gene MAOA which, when
combined with a violent upbringing, is correlated with higher degrees of aggressiveness,
was adduced to reduce the length of the prison sentence to 9 years and 2 months
(a reduction of approximately 3 years) (Feresin 2009). In the other case, both genetic and
neuroscientific evidence were relied upon by the court to mitigate the sentence of a 28 year
old woman who first killed her sister, and then attempted to kill her mother in order to
2 A technique recently described by Nishimoto et al. (2011) received much media coverage and scientific
attention after demonstrating the feasibility of decoding what movies were viewed by subjects from scans of
their brain activity obtained using current fMRI technology. Perhaps a future iteration of such technology
can help courts to decode not merely what images and movies are being viewed by subjects, but also what
images they remember or imagine.
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cover up her crime, from life to 20 years (Farisco and Petrini 2012). Nita Farahany’s
pioneering work at the Vanderbilt Law School shows a groundswell of cases in the USA in
recent years in which neuroscientific evidence is cited and relied upon in novel ways, and
similar projects that catalogue and analyse the appearance of such cases are also currently
under way in Australia, Canada, Germany, Italy, The Netherlands and the United King-
dom. The significance of neurolaw was recently recognised when The Royal Society
(2011:vi) released their findings about neuroscience and the law in which they recom-
mended (among other things) that ‘‘[a]n international meeting should take place every
3 years to bring together those working across the legal system with experts in neuro-
science and related disciplines’’ and that ‘‘[u]niversity law degrees should incorporate an
introduction to the basic principles of how science is conducted and to key areas of science
such as neuroscience and behavioural genetics’’.
This Special Issue’s Papers
The three papers contained in this special issue of Criminal Law and Philosophy address
questions that straddle the third and fourth groups of topics discussed above.
Jan Christoph Bublitz and Reinhard Merkel ask the broad normative question: In what
ways should it be permissible to change other people’s minds? Changing one another’s
minds through conversation or through other standard forms of communication is usually
deemed uncontroversial. But how about the following scenarios? Should fast food outlets
be allowed to add substances like Gherlin to their food and drinks, or to spray substances
into the air surrounding their restaurants, to induce desires for their products in customers
and in passers-by in order to boost sales? What if an online store used subliminal adver-
tising that primed customers with a preference for particular products—should that be
permitted? Should employers be allowed to add substances to their employees’ tea, coffee
or other beverages—e.g. psychostimulants—to increase their productivity? What if a
player in a game of poker sprayed the odourless substance Oxytocin around the table to
make other players more trusting and thus less likely to notice when she is bluffing? If
governments could convince the public to get behind laudable aims like reducing green-
house gas emissions through the use of subliminal television advertisements, should this be
permitted? The point is that the substances and techniques involved might have negligible
or even no adverse physical effects—i.e. health or physical injury might not be an issue—
but it still seems like at least some of these practices should be prohibited (or at least
controlled) qua illegitimate (or otherwise-troublesome) interferences with others’ mental
integrity. Bublitz and Merkel write that ‘‘[w]hile legal systems have developed detailed
rules of permissible conduct with bodies, have defined exceptions, counter exceptions,
conditions of consent, acceptable risks and compensable harm, legal doctrines over con-
duct with another’s mind are hard to find and strikingly underdeveloped.’’ However, they
contend that there are important reasons to distinguish between different ways of altering
other people’s minds—for instance, while ‘‘marital infidelity generating severe mental
suffering for the partner’’ may not be prohibited by the criminal law, ‘‘inducing the ‘same
pain’ through a different means, say, a lovesickness pill, triggering identical neuronal
activity and evoking the identical phenomenal experience of suffering should be imper-
missible’’. Bucking the trend in current neuroethics literature—for instance, Neil Levy’s
‘‘parity thesis’’ according to which direct and indirect interventions should often be treated
on a par with one another (Levy 2007:37–44), and Hank Greely’s claim that there is ‘‘no
qualitative difference between acting directly to change a criminal’s brain… and acting
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indirectly… to achieve similar ends’’ (2008:1134)—Bublitz and Merkel argue that from a
legal perspective there are compelling reasons to retain and take heed of this distinction. In
light of such reasons, they propose that the law should recognize the human right to mental
liberty, and to protect this right they propose elements of a new criminal offence
proscribing severe interventions into other minds.
While the focus of Bublitz and Merkel’s paper is broad—i.e. their concern is with how
anyone in society should be permitted to change anyone else’s mind—Elizabeth Shaw asks
a more narrowly-focused normative question about the law’s use of DBIs, namely: Under
what circumstances might it be permissible to use DBIs to rehabilitate convicted
criminals? Shaw begins by noting that despite the massive cost of keeping offenders
incarcerated, incarceration has a dismal record of rehabilitating offenders, with as many as
seventy per cent returning to prison shortly following their release. Given the shortcomings
of incarceration as a rehabilitative tool, and given that advances in neuroscience promise
more effective ways of altering human behaviour through DBIs, this raises the question of
whether the law should avail itself of such techniques. Shaw considers two explanations for
why we might recoil from this suggestion. The first explanation which she considers is that
altering people’s minds through DBIs might undermine their free will, conceived in
broadly compatibilist terms. However, she argues that philosophical compatibilism3 lacks
the theoretical resources to explain why such interventions might be problematic—in fact,
on her account compatibilists would ultimately have to accept that a person whose mind
had been thoroughly manipulated in certain ways would possess rather than lack free
will—and for this reason she looks elsewhere to explain why we might recoil from using
DBIs. According to Shaw, the best way to make sense of our concerns is by focusing on the
distinction between those techniques that would merely enhance the offender’s ‘‘capacity
responsibility’’ and those that would attempt to make offenders more responsible in the
‘‘virtue’’ sense. The former type of intervention would attempt to strengthen mental
capacities such as understanding and self-control which are necessary for agency and
participation in moral discourse with other members of the moral community, whereas the
latter would aim to instil in them particular values about what is right and wrong or
corresponding preferences. Enhancing virtue responsibility is unacceptable on her account
because it would objectify offenders—i.e. they would be treated as fundamentally different
from the rest of society, as creatures who are beyond redemption with whom we cannot
engage in moral dialogue, and who must thus be re-molded like mere objects—but also
because it would silence offenders and diminish the opportunities for society to learn when
its views, rather than the views of the offender, are what stand in need of revision. In
contrast, enhancing offenders’ capacity responsibility would give them the tools that they
need to engage in moral dialogue and practical reasoning through which they can, if they
so choose, re-shape their own values.
Finally, my own paper investigates whether three aims of the criminal law—namely,
justice, reform and therapy—can be promoted through the use of DBIs. DBI-based mental
capacity restoration techniques—for instance, psycho-active drugs—are sometimes used in
criminal cases to promote the aims of justice. For instance, they might be used to restore a
person’s competence to stand trial in order to assess the degree of their responsibility for
what they did, or to restore their competence for punishment so that we can hold them
3 This is a theoretical approach according to which free will and responsibility hinge not on whether our
behaviour is caused (or determined in some other way) or not, but on whether it is caused through
mechanisms in virtue of which we possess the right kinds of mental capacities—i.e. those, whichever they
are, which are required for moral agency.
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responsible for their crime. Some also suggest that such interventions might be used in
criminal legal contexts for therapy or reform—i.e. to make non-responsible and irre-
sponsible people more responsible. However, I argue that such interventions may at least
sometimes fail to promote these responsibility-related aims of the criminal law because, at
least on some accounts, responsibility hinges on other factors than just what mental
capacities a person has—in particular, it also hinges on such things as authenticity, per-
sonal identity, and mental capacity ownership—and there are compelling reasons to sus-
pect that some ways of restoring mental capacity (in particular DBIs) may adversely affect
these other factors. My concerns in this regard spring from two sources. First, I cite
mounting empirical evidence that DBIs can have profound effects on their subjects’
character and personality with similarly profound effects on qualitative aspects of their
personal identity, and these effects raise problems for attributions and impositions of
responsibility. Second, I also argue that the very same features that make DBIs attractive
within the context of the criminal law—i.e. their speed of action, their touted effectiveness,
and the fact that little cooperation or even input is needed from the person being treated to
have their effect—paradoxically also raise concerns about authenticity, personal identity
and mental capacity ownership which, alongside mental capacity, are also important
factors when it comes to responsibility. Put one way, my central claim is that what might
suffice for the restoration of competence might not suffice for the restoration of respon-
sibility. Put another way, I claim that although responsibility does indeed track mental
capacity, we should be wary of assuming that responsibility will also track restored mental
capacities—in particular, ones that have been restored through DBIs.
Timeliness of this Topic
Viewed from one perspective, DBIs do not raise new issues. In a recent opinion piece for
Clinical Pharmacology & Therapeutics, Hank Greely observes that ‘‘many of the[se
questions] were raised 40 years ago, during an earlier period of concern about what was
then called ‘mind control’’’ (Greely 2012:165; also see Lewis 1963). Ice-pick lobotomies,
surgical and chemical castration for sex offenders and paedophiles, and forced medication
to make people competent for trial and for execution raise familiar issues. However, as
Greely also points out, what has changed over the past 40 years is that ‘‘[n]ow… neuro-
science is likely to provide real direct brain interventions [for instance] to treat disfavored
behaviours, forcing us to decide whether, when, and how such interventions may be used’’
(2012:164–5).
Because of the order in which progress in this field is made—diagnostic techniques and
technologies must first be created by scientists and engineers; these can then be used in
neuroscientific studies and experiments that contribute to the growth of knowledge; and
this knowledge can eventually be drawn upon by other scientists, engineers and medical
researchers and practitioners to develop well-targeted interventions4—in the coming years
we can expect an increasing number of DBIs to be developed, and that gives this topic a
renewed sense of urgency. However, another thing that has changed in the intervening
years is that we have acquired those 40 years worth of experience with brilliant successes
4 This is an idealized picture, since often a much more opportunistic hit-and-miss approach is taken in the
development of new psychopharmaceuticals. Nevertheless, the basic idea—i.e. that a better understanding of
the brain-based correlates and causes of mental disorders can help us to develop better treatments for those
disorders—still holds.
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and dismal failures at using DBIs to alter people’s minds, and such experience can reveal
important oversights and foibles in our earlier thinking about this topic.
Greely suggests that it is not too early to talk about these issues (2012:165), and I agree.
They should be discussed and debated well before existing techniques and technologies are
further refined—before yet further intervention techniques are developed—to avoid finding
ourselves in a political climate where crime reduction and budget cuts are on the electoral
agenda, with temptingly effective tools at our disposal but no clear ethical or policy
directives for their use. This may help us to avoid the tragedies of psychosurgery, and to
steer clear of scenarios like those depicted by Burgess (2000) in the novel A Clockwork
Orange, later made into a movie with the same title by Stanley Kubrick. This may also
help to funnel resources towards research and development of those interventions which
are (even at a conceptual level) likely to achieve their aims, and which (at a normative
level) are likely to be permitted and maybe even endorsed, recommended, requested and
required.
I hope that the papers in this special issue stimulate further discussion of this topic.
Open Access This article is distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License
which permits any use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original author(s) and the
source are credited.
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